Rumi Khan

Work in Progress

Religious Awakening and the Provision of Social Goods in the Northeast United States, 1860–1920

Future Job Market Paper

Details

Before the welfare state, America’s churches and voluntary societies, the “Benevolent Empire,” supplied much of the country’s poor relief, hospital care and orphan care. Scholars from McLoughlin to Fogel credit the Third Great Awakening (c. 1860–1920) with this surge in Christian giving. In the same period, denominations were competing for adherents in cities that were rapidly growing and industrializing. I am building a new city-by-year panel from historical city directories to ask how revival and religious competition shaped what cities privately provided and what drove how inclusively they served the public.

Persistent Effects of Tang Buddhism

Details

Between the 7th and 9th centuries, the personal faith of Emperor Taizong and Empress Wu Zetian’s search for a Buddhist basis for her rule drove a state-sponsored expansion of monasteries across Tang China. The expansion came from court politics, not from local demand. These monasteries ran demanding ordination exams that rewarded memorization and composition, reminiscent of the later Imperial Examinations, and served as local providers of education, medicine and welfare. This expansion encouraged a lasting local culture that valued education. Using hundreds of geocoded and dated Tang-era monasteries, I find that prefectures with more of them produced more jinshi (the degree-holders who profoundly shaped medieval Chinese politics) per capita in later centuries, and that monastery density may even be associated with modern outcomes in health and tertiary education.

Confucian Clans and Labor Specialization during Reform and Opening Up, 1980–1985

Details

China’s first reform decade brought about the fastest wave of firm formation in world history. Rural entrepreneurs led this wave under a rigid labor market and with ample state credit. This project asks whether the Confucian clan, often seen as a barrier to modern organization, helped ease that transition. I argue that clans, through the bonds of family, gave new rural firms access to labor pools and lower monitoring costs at a time when labor, not capital, was the main constraint. I link newly digitized prefecture-level data from the 1985 industrial census to historical genealogy counts and find prefectures with higher historical clan density were more labor-intensive and became more so between 1980 and 1985. Their industrial output growth was no lower than elsewhere despite having more labor-intensive firms. Clans appear to have shaped the form of early rural industrialization without slowing its pace.